Dead Men Telling Tales: A Policy- Based Proposal for Survivability of \u3ci\u3eQui Tam\u3c/i\u3e Actions Under the Civil False Claims Act by Williams, Vickie
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 83 | Issue 4 Article 3
2005
Dead Men Telling Tales: A Policy- Based Proposal
for Survivability of Qui Tam Actions Under the
Civil False Claims Act
Vickie Williams
Gonzaga University, vwilliams@lawschool.gonzaga.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Vickie Williams, Dead Men Telling Tales: A Policy- Based Proposal for Survivability of Qui Tam Actions Under the Civil False Claims Act, 83
Neb. L. Rev. (2004)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol83/iss4/3
Vickie J. Williams*
Dead Men Telling Tales: A Policy-
Based Proposal for Survivability of
Qui Tam Actions Under the
Civil False Claims Act
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 1074
II. The Civil False Claims Act and Its Qui Tam
Provisions ............................................ 1079
A. The Current Version of the Civil False Claims
A ct ............................................... 1079
B. The Evolution of the Act ........................... 1080
III. Survivability of a Qui Tam Case Under the Act ........ 1083
A. The Historical Federal Common-Law Test ......... 1083
1. The Dual "Remedial" and "Penal" Nature of the
A ct ............................................ 1085
2. The Modern Formulation of the Historical Test
of Survivability ................................ 1087
a. The Purpose of the Act ..................... 1088
b. The Relationship Between the Relator and
the Government and the Concept of a
"Harmed Individual" ....................... 1089
c. Proportionality of Recovery Under the Act.. 1093
d. The Excessive Fines Clause ................ 1096
e. Cases Where There Is No Damage ......... 1098
B. Using "Civil" and "Criminal" Designations as a
Proxy for "Remedial" and "Punitive"
Characterizations ................................. 1098
IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Act ............. 1103
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. B.S. 1985, Tufts
University; J.D. 1990, New York University. The author thanks Ryan Goodell,
Greg Garneau, and Michael Shachat for their research assistance with this Arti-
cle, and S. Elizabeth Bowen for her editorial assistance. The author also thanks
her colleagues Mary Pat Treuthart and Sheri Engelken for their thoughtful com-
ments on earlier versions of this Article, and Lynn Daggett and Ann Murphy for
their encouragement.
1073
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
A. Public Disclosure and "Original Source" ........... 1103
B. Discovery Issues .................................. 1105
V. A Policy-Based Proposal for Survivability .............. 1108
A. The Importance of Congressional Intent ........... 1108
B. The Advantages of Using Congressional Intent To
Determine Survivability ........................... 1111
C. Applying the Test of Congressional Intent to the
A ct ............................................... 1112
VI. Conclusion ............................................ 1114
'You are well on your way to becoming a pirate already.., you are obsessed
with treasure."
Captain Jack Sparrow (Johnny Depp) to William Turner
(Orlando Bloom), in PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN-THE
CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney 2003).
"Yes I am a pirate, two hundred years too late. The cannons don't thunder,
there's nothing to plunder, I'm an over-forty victim of fate."
Jimmy Buffett, A Pirate Looks at Forty, on SONGS You
KNow By HEART (MCA Records 1990).
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the demise of job security for pirates during the modern
age lamented by singer/songwriter Jimmy Buffett in A Pirate Looks at
Forty, the box-office success of recent movies about pirates such as
Walt Disney Studio's Pirates of the Caribbean-The Curse of the Black
Pearl evidences the continued appeal of treasure-hunting and swash-
buckling in the modern world. Therefore, it should be no surprise that
a statute passed by Congress almost 140 years ago, designed to en-
courage private citizens to dig deeply into the affairs of entities that
contract with the federal government in search of wrongdoing and ex-
tract buried treasure, continues to appeal to the watchdogs of the pub-
lic fisc. More than a century after its birth as a fraud-fighting tool
during wartime, the Civil False Claims Act ("the Act")' continues to
pique the imagination and fuel dreams of bounty and glory for both
publicly anointed fraud-fighters and private persons who are author-
ized to sue on behalf of themselves and the Government under the
Act's unique "qui tam"2 provisions.3 Consider the following modern-
1. Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
2. The term "qui tam" is short for the Latin "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who pursues this action on our Lord the
King's behalf as well as his own." See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000). Early in American legal history, qui tam provisions in
federal law were relatively common. See 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS
AND Qui Tam Actions § 1.01[A] (2d ed. 2000). As the means for public law en-
forcement developed and increased, qui tam actions were increasingly disfavored
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day uses of the Act, which illustrate its continued appeal to private
citizens:
" In order to be reimbursed for their costs in caring for Medi-
care patients, hospitals prepare a "cost report" and submit it
to the federal government. A Chief Financial Officer of a hos-
pital in Whitefish, Montana refused to prepare an "aggres-
sive" cost report for submission to Medicare and an
inconsistent "reserve" cost report for submission to the hospi-
tal's auditors. The "aggressive" cost report showed greater
costs to the hospital for caring for Medicare patients than the
"reserve" cost report showed. The CFO was terminated from
his position. In the course of pursuing a wrongful termina-
tion action against the hospital's management company,
which was a national company, the CFO discovered that all
of the hospitals managed by the company submitted "aggres-
sive" cost reports to Medicare that he considered fraudulent.
The CFO filed a qui tam action under the Act against the
management company, resulting in a total settlement pay-
ment of $85,773,745.81 by the company and a recovery of
$20,585,698.99 by the CFO.a
" A sales representative for a cardiovascular device manufac-
turer filed a qui tam suit under the Act against 132 teaching
hospitals. He alleged that they had defrauded federal health
care programs by submitting claims and receiving payments
for services provided to patients participating in clinical tri-
als involving cardiac devices that had not been fully approved
for marketing by the Food and Drug Administration, in viola-
tion of a provision of a 1986 Medicare Manual that stated
that payment would not be made for such procedures. The
case, filed in 1994, continues ten years later against forty
hospitals. The government and the sales representative have
collected millions of dollars from teaching hospitals that have
settled the cases against them.5
" A disgruntled doctoral student brought a qui tam action
under the Act against his former faculty advisor, alleging
that the faculty advisor collaborated with other researchers
to publish scholarly articles based on fabricated research and
used the publications to defraud the Veterans Administra-
in law, and by the twentieth century, had virtually disappeared from federal law.
Id.
4. United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
5. In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318 (D. Conn. 2004); Warren
King, UW Agrees To Settle Over Billing Claims, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Seattle Times File.
2005] 1075
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion. The complaint was ultimately dismissed, but not before
the defendant incurred significant costs by being forced to de-
fend the matter on the student's appeal to the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 6
Recoveries under the Act are potentially enormous, because the
Act authorizes the imposition of treble damages and substantial per-
claim penalties against its violators.7 The magnitude of potential re-
covery provides federal prosecutors with a strong incentive to use the
Act. But this powerful weapon does not work only for the federal gov-
ernment. The Act's "qui tam" or whistleblower provision allows a pri-
vate party to sue on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the United
States, and to collect a substantial bounty if the suit is successful.8
Actions brought by whistleblowers under the Act recovered a total of
$1.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 alone.9
The similarity between whistleblowing under the Act and the pur-
suit of bounty on the high seas did not go unnoticed even by the first
courts to construe the statute, well over one hundred years ago. Early
in the history of the Act, one court described the qui tam provisions of
the Act as follows: "Prosecutions conducted by such means [through a
private whistleblower] compare with the ordinary methods as the en-
terprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel."' 0 The po-
tential windfall encourages private parties to attempt to use this
fraud-fighting weapon for their own financial benefit, even when the
United States has determined that it has no interest in pursuing a
particular case. 1 '
Just as the potential rewards to the successful whistleblower are
never far from the minds of potential qui tam relators 12 under the Act,
the specter of financial ruin and adverse publicity that inevitably fol-
lows a prosecution under the Act is never far from the minds of enti-
6. United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2004).
7. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
8. Id. § 3730(d). The bounty is paid regardless of whether the defendant loses at
trial or settles the case. Id.
9. False Claims Act: Pursuit of False Claims Cases Brings "Extraordinary" Re-
wards, DOJ Official Says, 8 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 520 (June 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Pursuit of False Claims].
10. United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885), affd, 30 F. 762 (D. Or.
1887).
11. According to the head of the Department of Justice's Civil Division, the United
States declines to intervene in over eighty percent of qui tam cases. Pursuit of
False Claims, supra note 9, at 520.
12. A "relator" is a person who furnishes information on which a civil or criminal case
is based. BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004). The private person who
brings a case under the Act's qui tam provisions is called the "relator," and the
caption of such a case generally reads "United States ex rel. _ ." See Pursuit
of False Claims, supra note 9, at 520.
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ties that contract with the federal government.13 The magnitude of
the damages recoverable under the Act, the collateral consequences of
being found liable under the Act,14 and the inevitable tension between
the United States, the relator, and the defendant when a treasure-
hunting relator independently pursues a case that the United States
has declined to pursue, gives rise to unique legal issues and chal-
lenges. In addition to substantive legal complications, many procedu-
ral complications spring from the complex relationship between the
relator and the Government, and from the unique procedural require-
ments for bringing a qui tam action under the Act.15
Not least among these complications is the length of time that a
qui tam case under the Act can be under development, or filed and
pending in court, before the defendant even knows of the action's exis-
tence. The statute of limitations for bringing a case under the Act can
be as long as ten years.' 6 Even once a case is filed in court, the United
States can request to keep it under seal for long periods of time, in
renewable increments, at the discretion of the court.17 Additionally,
along with a civil prosecution initiated under the Act, the United
States often initiates a parallel criminal proceeding based on the same
conduct, warranting a stay of the Act's civil proceedings.18 It is also
not uncommon for the defendant to declare bankruptcy while proceed-
13. See generally Stephanie L. Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care
Providers: How the Civil False Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and Why the Act
Warrants Reform of Its Damages and Penalties Provision, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
159, 161-62 (2003) (describing the financial impact of prosecutions under the Act
on health care providers).
14. For example, a health care provider who is found liable under the Act may be
excluded from participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c-5(b) (2000). For most health care providers, exclusion from these pro-
grams signals the end of their existence.
15. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000).
16. A civil action under the Act must be brought within six years from the date of the
violation, or three years from when the facts material to the right of action are
known or reasonably should have been known by the United States, with an
outside limit of ten years after the date on which the violation was committed,
whichever is later. Id. § 3731(b).
17. Id. § 3730(b)(3). It is not uncommon for cases to remain under seal for many
months, and sometimes many years. See, e.g., In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam
Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 323-27 (D. Conn. 2004) (allowing sixteen extensions of the
seal, the longest being for three years); United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker &
Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (a case that remained sealed for
eighteen months).
18. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4). In such circumstances, stays may be sought by either
the Government, in order to take advantage of the collateral estoppel effect of a
criminal conviction in a subsequent civil case, or by the defendant, to avoid hav-
ing to assert Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination during question-
ing in the civil matter. See 2 BOESE, supra note 3, § 5.03[A].
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ings under the Act are pending, triggering an automatic stay of the
proceedings in accordance with federal bankruptcy law.19
Given the uncommonly long time periods that a qui tam relator's
cause of action under the Act can remain in limbo, both prior to filing
and after it is filed in court, the prospect of a relator's death during the
pendency of the action is very real. 20 When the relator dies while the
case remains pending, and the United States has declined to intervene
in the case, the court must decide whether the action survives the re-
lator's death. The Supreme Court of the United States has issued con-
flicting guidance about the "punitive"21 or "remedial"22 nature of the
Act, the distinction that is the basis for the historical test for
survivability or abatement of a federal statutory cause of action.
Therefore, lower courts faced with this question have reached conflict-
ing conclusions.23
Part II of this Article discusses the current version of the Act and
its evolution from its original 1863 version. Part III discusses the his-
torical common-law test for determining whether an action based on a
federal statute survives or abates upon the plaintiffs death. It then
discusses the special problems of applying this test to the Act, caused
by the dual remedial and penal nature of the Act, and the complex
relationship between the qui tam relator and the Government as
plaintiffs in cases brought under the Act. Part IV discusses the
unique provisions of the Act that limit the courts' subject matter juris-
diction in certain cases, and the effect those provisions have on the
survivability analysis. Part V proposes adopting a simpler, policy-
based test for survivability of a qui tam action under the Act, and ex-
plains why, under this test, such cases should survive the death of a
relator, except in the rare case where the court cannot establish its
subject matter jurisdiction, or the defendant is so severely prejudiced
by the absence of the relator that principles of federal civil procedure
require that the case be dismissed.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). There is a split of authority among federal courts regard-
ing whether an exception to the automatic stay provisions of federal bankruptcy
law for an action brought by the government to enforce its police power applies to
cases brought under the Act. See id. § 364(b)(4); 2 BOESE, supra note 3, § 5.03[C].
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Providence in Or., 209 F.
Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002).
21. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
784-85 (2000).
22. See Cook County, fll. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130-31
(2003).
23. Compare Harrington, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (holding that the qui tam relator's
cause of action abates upon his death), with United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC
Corp., 11 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the qui tam relator's cause of
action survives his death).
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II. THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS
QUI TAM PROVISIONS
A. The Current Version of the Civil False Claims Act
The current version of the Civil False Claims Act ("the Act") makes
liable any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim to the United States for payment or ap-
proval.2 4 The Act also imposes liability for making false records or
statements designed to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the United States.25 The "knowl-
edge" required for violation of the Act includes actual knowledge of the
information, deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the informa-
tion, and reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. 26
No specific intent to defraud is required. 27 A person found liable
under the Act is subject to treble damages and a penalty of $5000 to
$10,000 per claim. 28
A private person (the qui tam relator) may bring a civil action for
violation of the Act, for the person and for the United States ("the Gov-
ernment").29 The relator must serve the complaint and a "written dis-
closure of substantially all material evidence and information the
person possesses" on the Government. 3 0 The complaint must be filed
in camera, under seal, and it remains under seal for at least sixty
days, subject to the Government's motions to extend the seal for good
cause shown.31 While the case remains under seal, the Government is
supposed to investigate the claims and the evidence revealed in the
disclosure statement and determine whether it wants to intervene in
the action and prosecute the defendant under its own name. 32 If the
Government declines to intervene, the relator may pursue the case
without the Government. 33 If the relator proceeds alone, the relator is
entitled to receive between twenty-five and thirty percent of the pro-
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
25. Id. § 3729(a)(7). The Act's prohibitions are very broad, and encompass many dif-
ferent types of claims to the United States. For a good, general categorization of
the contexts in which the majority of cases under the Act arise, see 1 BOESE,
supra note 3, § 1.06.
26. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 3729(a). The amount of penalties was increased to a minimum of $5500 and
a maximum of $11,000 pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
31 U.S.C.). 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(9) (2004).
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000).
30. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
31. See id. § 3730(b)(2)-(3).
32. See United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 998-99 (2d
Cir. 1995).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(c).
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ceeds or settlement of the action.34 If the Government intervenes, the
relator's share will be between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the
proceeds or settlement.35
B. The Evolution of the Act
The original False Claims Act was enacted in 1863, in response to
alleged fraud and waste in government contracts between the Union
army and unscrupulous private contractors during the Civil War.36 It
contained a qui tam provision from its inception. 37 Qui tam statutes
were imported from England, where Blackstone characterized them as
penal statutes, designed to redress wrongs to the public.3S Because
the qui tam relator sues on behalf of the Government, the relator can
be looked upon as an advocate of the public interest, taking the place
of public officials who would otherwise advocate the public interest.39
At the time of the original Act, the United States Attorney General
had little assistance in carrying out his responsibilities, and the qui
tam action was a popular means of counteracting the lack of an effec-
tive public police force for investigating and dealing with public
wrongs. 40 At the time of enactment, the False Claims Act authorized
remedies of double damages, a penalty of $2,000 per false claim, and
criminal sanctions.41
Despite the potential for large monetary awards against violators
of the statute, early caselaw characterized the Act as remedial, but
designed to protect the public interest. In United States v. Griswold,42
the trial court stated: "The statute is a remedial one. It is intended to
protect the treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that
encompasses it on every side, and should be construed accordingly." 43
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Government's reach into the
economic life of the nation grew longer.44 More financial dealings be-
34. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
35. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
36. 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.01[A].
37. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733 (2000)). The original Act authorized an award to the relator equal
to one-half of the amount of final judgment against the defendant. Id. § 6.
38. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161.
39. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REv. 539, 551 (2000).
40. 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.01[A].
41. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 3, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current civil version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000) and current criminal version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 286-287, 1001-1002 (2000)).
42. 24 F. 361 (D. Or. 1885), affd, 30 F. 762 (D. Or. 1887).
43. Id. at 366. Despite the apparent perception of the judiciary that the federal trea-
sury was being attacked on all sides, very few cases were brought under the 1863
version of the Act. See 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.01[B].
44. 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.01[B].
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tween the Government and private business created more opportuni-
ties for fraud and whistleblowing. Enterprising qui tam relators
began to use information in publicly available criminal indictments to
initiate civil cases under the Act.45 In the landmark case of United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,46 the qui tam relator merely copied a
publicly available criminal indictment into a civil complaint and filed
it under the then-current version of the Act. 47 His complaint re-
quested half of the Government's proceeds from a civil judgment based
on the complaint, although the relator brought no new information to
the Government. 48 The Government argued for dismissal, on the
grounds that such cases served no public purpose, as they added noth-
ing to the Government's preexisting knowledge of a particular fraud,
and served only to require the Government to share any recovery of
fraudulent gains with a relator who had added no value to the case.
4 9
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected this argument,
based on the text of the Act, which did not limit rewards to relators
who provided new information to the Government.
5 0
The Marcus decision prompted the Attorney General of the United
States to request repeal of the qui tam provisions of the Act.51 Repeal
legislation passed the House of Representatives, but the provisions
were reinstituted by the Senate.52 Rather than repeal the qui tam
provisions altogether, to address the seeming ability of relators to en-
rich themselves under the Act with no concomitant benefit to the pub-
lic, Congress amended the Act in 1943 to absolutely bar the federal
courts from having jurisdiction over qui tam suits based on allegations
known to the government before the suit was filed.53 This jurisdic-
tional bar remained in place even if the relator was the original source
of the government's information.
54
Although the 1943 amendments may have had the desired effect of
emphasizing the remedial nature of the Act, the courts interpreted
them in such a way as to have the undesired effect of chilling relators'
use of the statute to assist the United States in detecting fraud and
45. Id.
46. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
47. See id. at 558 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 545-46.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 546.
51. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5276.
52. Id.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3732 (2000)).
54. 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.02. The original Senate amendments allowed a relator
who was the original source of the Government's information to proceed even if
the information was already in the possession of the Government, but the result-
ing conference report dropped this clause. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277.
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waste in government contracting. 55 In 1986, in response to Congress's
perception that "fraud permeates generally all Government programs
ranging from welfare and food stamps benefits, to multibillion dollar
defense procurements, to crop subsidies and disaster relief pro-
grams,"5 6 Congress amended the Act, intending to make it easier and
more attractive for relators to bring private suits under the Act.5 7 The
most notable changes ("1986 Amendments") were: (1) clarifying that
specific intent to defraud was not required to establish a violation of
the Act, and that acting in deliberate ignorance of the fraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth of the information in a claim provided
to the Government was sufficient to violate the Act;58 (2) clarifying
that the burden of proof for a violation of the Act was the standard
burden for civil cases, i.e., a "preponderance of the evidence";59 (3)
lengthening the statute of limitations in certain cases; 60 (4) changing
the remedy for violating the Act from double to treble damages and
significantly increasing the money penalties available under the
Act;61 and (5) expanding the rights of qui tam relators and increasing
their financial incentives to bring suit under the Act. 6 2
Despite these changes to the Act, all of which increased the harsh-
ness of the potential penalty for violating the Act, and many of which
enhanced the ability and incentives for private persons to benefit from
bringing violations of the Act to the Government's attention, Congress
repeatedly emphasized the public yet remedial purpose of the Act
when explaining the amendments. 6 3 Nowhere does Congress state
that it intended to redress individual wrongs via the Act's qui tam
55. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269-70.
56. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267.
57. See id. at 4-6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269-71.
58. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272. Contra United States v. Aer-
odex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972).
59. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 30-31, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5295-96.
Contra United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962).
60. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.
61. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000). Despite the seemingly large increase in money
penalties made by the 1986 Amendments to the Act (from a $2,000 to a $10,000
maximum), according to the Congressional Research Service, the buying power of
$2,000 in 1863 was actually close to $18,000 in 1986. H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 17
(1986). Thus, this was not really an increase as much as a cost of living adjust-
ment, and an incomplete one at that.
62. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1), (d)(1)-(2) (2000); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24, re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89.
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266
(stating that the False Claims Reform Act's purpose "is to enhance the Govern-
ment's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Govern-
ment"); id at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271 (describing the Act as "a
civil remedy designed to make the Government whole for fraud losses").
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enforcement scheme. 64 The public interest purpose of qui tam actions
under the amended Act has been recognized by a majority of courts
that have interpreted the amended Act.65
Nevertheless, since enactment of the 1986 Amendments, not every
court has agreed that the Act serves only a public purpose. In United
States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp.,66 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted that a qui tam relator may suffer substantial emotional
and financial harm due to his unwitting involvement in fraud, or due
to his status as a relator.67 Citing these examples of possible individ-
ual harms suffered by a relator, the Neher court held that the Act's qui
tam provisions are intended to redress wrongs suffered by individual
relators, and not the general public. 68 The Neher court went on to
hold that because the qui tam provisions of the Act are designed to
redress individual wrongs suffered by relators, they are remedial as to
the relator and survive the relator's death.69 The Neher court used
the historical common-law test for survivability of a federal statutory
cause of action to reach this result.70
III. SURVIVABILITY OF A QUI TAM CASE UNDER THE ACT
A. The Historical Federal Common-Law Test
The survivability of a cause of action created by federal statute is
determined by federal common law, unless there is an expression of
64. The 1986 Amendments created a new cause of action against an employer who
retaliates against an employee because the employee aided in a prosecution
under the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). This cause of action contemplates that a
successful employee-plaintiff has suffered an individual wrong, because the em-
ployee is entitled to "all relief necessary to make the employee whole" as a rem-
edy, including reinstatement, two times the amount of back pay owed plus
interest, and compensation for special damages. Id. The double back pay dam-
ages of subsection 3730(h) have been held to be remedial rather than punitive.
See, e.g., Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087-88
(E.D. Mo. 2001); United States ex rel. Satalich v. City of Los Angeles, 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1092, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Such holdings support interpreting the
anti-retaliation provision of the Act as redressing an individual wrong.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. 11 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1993).
67. Id. at 138.
68. Id. The Neher court appeared to be construing the pre-1986 version of the Act,
which the United States had characterized as "remedial" in United States v.
Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976). The pre-1986 version of the Act also did not
contain a specific remedy for employee-whistleblowers who experience retaliation
as a result of their whistleblowing activities. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
69. 11 F.3d at 138-39. The Neher court did not consider the possibility that the anti-
retaliation provisions of the amended Act, rather than the qui tam provisions,
were designed to redress individual wrongs.
70. Id. at 137.
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contrary intent in the statute itself.71 There is no expression of con-
trary intent in the Act.72 Therefore, if one uses the historical test, one
must look to federal common law to determine whether a cause of ac-
tion under the Act survives the relator's death.
Under the historical federal common-law test for survivability, ac-
tions that are "penal" abate upon the death of a plaintiff,73 while "re-
medial" actions survive. At common law, a statute giving a private
right of action against a wrongdoer was truly "penal" only when it im-
posed punishment for an offense committed against the sovereign or
the State.74 Statutes that created a private right of action against a
wrongdoer for a party who was not injured by the wrongdoer (such as
a qui tam relator) were characterized as "penal" in some ways, but not
"strictly" penal in the traditional sense.7 5 As the Supreme Court of
the United States explained:
The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover damages
caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to be "penal against
the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer." A statute giving the
right to recover back money lost at gaming and, if the loser does not sue
within a certain time, authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other
person for threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser,
though penal as regards the suit by a common informer.
7 6
Statutes that provided for recovery to a party who was injured by
the defendant's conduct were considered "remedial," and thus sur-
vived the death of the plaintiff, while statutes that provided for recov-
ery to an uninjured party, even if not the public, were considered
"penal" in some sense. 77 With regard to common-law claims that were
not based on statutes, suits based on claims that were considered "per-
sonal" to the plaintiff, such as tort actions for personal injuries, abated
upon the death of the plaintiff, while suits based on property or con-
tract rights survived the plaintiff.78
The difficulty with applying this approach to determining the
survivability of a qui tam action under the Act arises from the complex
nature of the statute itself, in addition to the complex relationship be-
tween the relator and the Government. The statute is designed to
71. Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distributors of the United States & Canada,
6 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925).
72. See Neher, 11 F.3d at 137; United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Provi-
dence in Or., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1086 (D. Or. 2002).
73. Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884).
74. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1892); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *2.
75. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667-68.
76. Id. at 667 (citation omitted). See also Schreiber, 110 U.S. at 79-80 (characteriz-
ing as punitive a suit for statutory penalties and forfeitures for copyright in-
fringement, where the deceased plaintiff had not sustained any damage due to
the alleged copyright infringement).
77. Huntington, 145 U.S. at 667.
78. Almour v. Pace, 193 F.2d 699, 700 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 83:10731084
DEAD MEN TELLING TALES
compensate the public (the Government) for losses sustained as a vic-
tim of fraud, and thus, it fits the historical definition of a "penal" stat-
ute.79 Nevertheless, the statute is remedial in that it authorizes
recovery to an injured party.SO The difficulty arises from the fact that
the injured party is the public, against whom remedies for offenses
were traditionally considered punitive, and therefore, not survivable.
The Act codifies a remedy for the common-law tort of fraud, which was
traditionally a "personal" claim of a plaintiff that does not survive
death.81 Nevertheless, when the plaintiff is a qui tam relator, the in-
jury asserted is the injury of the Government, a party that does not
die with the relator.8 2 Even where the Government has declined to
intervene in the case, it remains a party, with the right to have all
pleadings and deposition transcripts served on it by request, and it
may intervene at a later date "upon a showing of good cause."
8 3
1. The Dual "Remedial" and "Penal" Nature of the Act
The dual remedial and penal nature of the Act is best illustrated by
a series of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States
on who can be a defendant under the Act. In Vermont Agency of Natu-
ral Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,8 4 the Court was asked to
decide whether states were "persons" who could be sued under the
Act.85 In holding that as a matter of statutory construction, states
were not persons who could be sued under the Act, the Stevens Court
described the Act as "a federal law designed to benefit 'the citizens of
the United States, not the citizens of any individual State that might
violate the [statute].'"86 Despite the fact that this purpose is consis-
tent with a finding that the Act is remedial with regard to the Govern-
ment, the Court's opinion in Stevens muddied the waters regarding
the punitive versus remedial nature of the Act with regard to relators.
79. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.
80. See id.
81. See Schreiber, 110 U.S. at 80.
82. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773
(2000).
83. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000). Out of 3954 qui tam cases filed through September
30, 2002, the Government had intervened in only 718 cases as of December 16,
2002. 2 BOESE, supra note 3, app. H-1. These statistics indicate that it is uncom-
mon for the Government to intervene, either at the inception of the case or later
for "good cause."
84. 529 U.S. 765, 765 (2000).
85. See id. at 784 n.14.
86. Id. at 785 n.15 (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)). See
also Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133-34
(2003) (quoting S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5266-67) (stating that the basic purpose of the 1986 Amendments was to
make the Act a "more useful tool" to combat fraud against the Government) (em-
phasis added).
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As part of its holding, the Stevens Court, without any historical analy-
sis or the application of any test for distinguishing "punitive" civil ac-
tions from "remedial" civil actions, characterized the treble damages
and civil penalty provisions of the Act as "punitive."87 The Court did
not distinguish between the "punitive" purposes of the Act's remedies
as applied by a qui tam relator versus their "remedial" purposes as
applied by the United States, although longstanding precedent per-
mitted the Court to make such a distinction.88
After Stevens, lower federal courts were left with little guidance on
how to characterize the Act for purposes of applying it to cases where
the defendant was traditionally immune from punitive damages, and
the Government had declined to intervene in the case. It is not sur-
prising that lower courts came to conflicting conclusions regarding the
applicability of the Act to municipalities, which engage in a great deal
of contracting with the Government, yet are traditionally immune
from punitive damages.89 It is also not surprising that a federal court
faced with the specific question of survivability of a relator's action
struggled to answer the question consistent with Stevens and the his-
torical common-law test. In United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters
of Providence in Oregon,90 the only reported case since Stevens to de-
cide the question of whether a cause of action brought by a qui tam
relator under the Act survives the relator's death, the court attempted
to apply the traditional common-law test of "remedial" versus "puni-
tive" to the question. Trying to reconcile legislative history indicating
that the Act was primarily meant to be remedial with Stevens's char-
acterization of the current version of the Act as "punitive," the Har-
rington court held that even if the Act could still be considered
remedial after Stevens, because Harrington had not alleged personal
or substantial individual harm, the claim was not remedial as to him,
and it did not survive his death.91 The Harrington court did not con-
87. 529 U.S. at 784-85. The Court used the punitive characterization of damages
under the Act to bolster its argument that Congress did not intend to include the
states, which are immune from punitive damages at common law, in the defini-
tion of "persons" who could be liable under the Act. See id. at 783-87.
88. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1892).
89. Compare United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, Ill., 277 F.3d 969 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that municipalities, which are presumed to be immune from
punitive damage actions, could be sued under the Act), affd sub nom. Cook
County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003), with United
States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 279 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2002), vacated by
538 U.S. 119 (2003), and United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 244 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that municipalities cannot be sued
under the Act because the Act imposes punitive damages), vacated by 538 U.S.
119 (2003).
90. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002).
91. Id. at 1088-89.
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sider the effect of the Court's holding in Stevens that the injured party
was the Government, which survives the relator's death.
92
Shortly thereafter, in Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel.
Chandler,9 3 the Court attempted to clarify its statements regarding
the punitive versus remedial nature of the treble damages provisions
of the Act, at least for purposes of applying the Act to municipalities
that are immune from punitive damages at common law. The Chan-
dler Court characterized the Act's treble damages as having a "com-
pensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive
objectives."94 The Court specifically acknowledged the role that the
presence of a qui tam relator plays in characterizing the Act's dam-
ages as "compensatory," retreating from its prior statement in Stevens
that treble damages under the Act were "punitive."9 5 The Court re-
emphasized that the purpose of the statute was public, to compensate
the Government, rather than to redress a qui tam relator's individual
wrong.
96
2. The Modern Formulation of the Historical Test of
Survivability
In Murphy v. Household Finance Corp.,97 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit articulated a test that is widely used
to characterize a federal statutory cause of action as "penal" or "reme-
dial."98 The Murphy test was created from earlier judicial pronounce-
ments of the factors a court should consider in determining the penal
versus remedial nature of a federal statute.9 9 Under the Murphy test,
a court looks at: "(1) whether the purpose of the statute was to redress
individual wrongs or more general wrongs to the public; (2) whether
recovery under the statute runs to the harmed individual or to the
public; and (3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is
wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered."oo Although this test
92. See id.
93. 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
94. Id. at 130. See also United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001)
[Mackby I] (holding that the Act's treble damages provision, in combination with
the Act's statutory penalties, is not "solely" remedial).
95. Chandler, 538 U.S. at 131-32.
96. See id.
97. 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977).
98. The Supreme Court of the United States did not cite to this test in either Stevens,
529 U.S. 765 (2000), or Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, when discussing the penal and
remedial nature of the Act. Nevertheless, in United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC,
11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1994), the court used the Murphy test to determine
survivability of a qui tam case under the Act.
99. See Murphy, 560 F.2d at 208-09 (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,
666-67 (1892), and earlier cases cited therein).
100. Id. at 209; see Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668 (first prong); Read v. Stewart, 129
Mass. 407, 410 (1880) (second prong); 3 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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has not explicitly been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States, its elements are rooted in longstanding precedents discussing
what a court should consider when determining the "penal" or "reme-
dial" nature of a statute.lOl Although the Murphy test has both a his-
torical pedigree and a degree of flexibility, because of the dual nature
of the Act and the differing interests and rights of the two parties
deemed to be plaintiffs in a qui tam case, analyzing the Act under each
of the test's prongs does not yield a satisfactory answer to the question
of whether a qui tam case survives the death of the relator.
a. The Purpose of the Act
As illustrated in section II.B, supra, the text and the legislative
history of the 1986 Amendments do little to clear up the confusion
regarding the punitive versus remedial nature of the Act.102 Histori-
cally, breaches of public rights and duties, which affect the whole com-
munity, are "distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and
misdemeanors," and sanctions for such breaches are considered puni-
tive.1O3 Given that the historical purpose of the Act, including its qui
tam provisions, was to redress and deter general wrongs to the public,
and that the strong legislative history indicating that the 1986
Amendments to the Act have, first and foremost, the purpose of re-
dressing general wrongs to the public, one could argue that the Act
should be considered punitive, despite the continual insistence of Con-
gress that its purpose is remedial. The traditional "punitive" versus
"remedial" distinction simply does not fit a federal statute designed to
redress financial losses to the Government, as well as to deter viola-
tions of public rights and duties. It does not provide guidance for a
court to determine whether such a statute can or should be considered
to redress an "individual" harm, albeit a harm to the Government,
such that a cause of action brought under the statute should survive
the relator, who has not suffered personal harm.
*161 (first prong). See also Stevenson v. Stoufer, 21 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 1946)
(recovery of $1750 based on overcharges totaling $26.25 under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 indicated that the cause of action created by the statute
was penal, rather than remedial).
101. See, e.g, Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668; Read, 129 Mass. at 410.
102. This confusion regarding the punitive or remedial nature of statutory treble dam-
ages provisions is not unique to the Act. It also appears in construction of the
federal antitrust laws and their treble damages provisions. See Cinnamon v. Ab-
ner A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833, 837 (E.D. Mich. 1963); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monop-
olies and Restraints of Trade § 393 (2004).
103. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
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b. The Relationship Between the Relator and the Government
and the Concept of a "Harmed Individual"
The relationship between the relator and the United States has
been described as one of "mandated cooperation."'104 The Act contem-
plates the relator working with the Government, but with the Govern-
ment exercising significant control over the case. 0 5 When the United
States intervenes in the action, it has the power to dismiss the action
over the objections of the relator,106 settle the action over the objec-
tions of the relator,10 7 and restrict the participation of the relator in
the action.' 0 8 Even when the United States declines to intervene in
the case, the United States may move to dismiss the relator's case if it
believes that pursuing the case is not in the Government's best inter-
ests.10 9 This intricate and unique relationship between the relator
and the Government, in which the two parties who are supposedly al-
igned in interest disagree about the merits of and/or the methodology
for pursuing the case, is one of the reasons why application of the his-
torical test for survivability of a federal statutory cause of action is
unworkable with regard to qui tam actions brought under the Act.
104. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 949
(2002).
105. Id.
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2000).
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
108. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
109. See Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 944 (2003); United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird Neece
Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998); Juliano v. Federal Asset Dis-
position Ass'n., 736 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D. D.C. 1990), aff'd, 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). Although cooperation between the relator and the Government is
likely and expected when the United States intervenes in the action and prose-
cutes the case, this cooperative atmosphere often evaporates when the United
States declines to intervene, or when the interests of the United States and the
interests of the relator do not coincide. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex
rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 n.5 (1997). Caselaw is replete with references to
conflicts between the relator and the United States when the United States has
declined to intervene in a case under the Act, and the relator has taken action of
which the United States does not approve. See, e.g., United States v. Schimmels
(In re Schimmels), 127 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1997) (The United States attempted to
escape the outcome of the relator's adversary proceeding in bankruptcy against a
defendant under the Act after it declined to intervene in the relator's proceed-
ing.); United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.
1994) (The United States objected to settlement of case brought by the relator
under the Act, alleging collusion between the relator and the defendant to de-
prive the United States of its fair share of the settlement.). Likewise, relators
often claim that the United States does not represent their interests in conjunc-
tion with cases brought under the Act. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala,
125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997) (The relator alleged that his interests were not ade-
quately represented by the United States in an action collateral to a claim
brought by the relator under the Act, because the United States had not yet de-
cided whether to intervene in the relator's action.).
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A relator sues on behalf of the United States as well as himself.11o
In Stevens,"' the Supreme Court of the United States unequivocally
stated that. this language means that the relator is not merely a mech-
anism of enforcement, as had been suggested by some lower federal
courts. 112 For the first time, the Court stated that a qui tam relator is
a partial assignee of the United States' injury in fact, with standing to
assert a claim on his own behalf, not merely as a tool of the Govern-
ment.113 Although the Court's characterization of the relator as a par-
tial assignee assured the relator's status as something more than a
mechanism of enforcement, in so holding, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the idea that a qui tam relator alleges a personal in-
jury sufficient to confer constitutional standing to bring a claim under
the Act."l 4 According to the Court, the qui tam relator has no per-
sonal injury even if the relator alleged having suffered personal harm
or difficulty as a result of the defendant's actions."S5 The Court
thereby rejected a concept that had been embraced by some lower
courts to explain why the relator had constitutional standing to bring
suit.116
The characterization of the relationship between the qui tam rela-
tor and the United States also affects the characterization of the re-
covery that the qui tam relator receives. As the Stevens Court stated,
if the relator is merely a statutorily designated agent of the United
States, "the relator's bounty is simply the fee he receives out of the
United States' recovery for filing and/or prosecuting a successful action
on behalf of the Government."117 If this was the case, and if the rela-
110. See Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 877 n.1.
111. 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).
112. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. Semtner v. Med. Consultants, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 490,
494 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
113. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773-74.
114. Id. at 772-73. Because a qui tam relator represents the Government's interests,
several courts have held that a qui tam relator cannot pursue a qui tam action
pro se. See United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1951). Such a holding appears to
ignore the recognition of the Supreme Court of the United States in Stevens that,
according to the Act, the relator sues on behalf of himself as well as the Govern-
ment. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Lu court did
not even mention Stevens in its opinion. Perhaps Judge Posner was influenced to
dismiss the case outright, without examining the soundness of holding that a pro
se relator cannot bring a case in light of Stevens, by the fact that he thought the
complaint was "incoherent, even crazy." Lu, 368 F.3d at 776.
115. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773-74.
116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 739 (3d
Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., 11 F.3d 136, 137-38 (11th
Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir.
1993); United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Providence in Or., 209 F.
Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Or. 2002).
117. 529 U.S. at 772.
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tor's standing to sue in a qui tam case brought under the Act was
merely as an agent of the United States, the bounty a successful rela-
tor received under the Act should have the same character as the
United States' recovery. If treble damages and penalties of up to
$11,000 per claim under the Act are punitive when there is no qui tam
relator, then they should be punitive when collected through the ac-
tions of the qui tam relator as an agent. If they are remedial, then
they should be remedial whether collected via a qui tam relator agent
or by the United States acting alone.
As the Stevens Court recognized, characterizing the qui tam relator
as an agent of the United States reads out of the Act its language
authorizing a person to bring a civil action under the Act "for the per-
son" as well as for the United States Government."l 8 Under accepted
principles of statutory construction, the Act should not be so con-
strued. 1 19 By characterizing the qui tam relator as a "partial as-
signee" of the United States, 120 the Court remained true to the text of
the statute and avoided reading this provision out of the statute, in
accordance with the tenets of statutory construction.
Nevertheless, the Court's characterization of the relator as a "par-
tial assignee" renders unworkable the application of the second prong
of the Murphy formulation of the common-law test to determine
survivability of a qui tam action under the Act. An assignee typically
stands in the shoes of the assignor with respect to both the injury and
the remedy.121 But the typical assignee has paid some consideration
to the assignor for the assignment,12 2 which is not the case for qui tam
relators. Furthermore, it is well-established that a "claim" cannot
simply refer to the right to bring suit.12 3 Congress cannot grant
standing to party based on only a public interest in the proper admin-
istration of the laws. 12
4
Therefore, it remains unclear what part of the United States' claim
under the Act is assigned to the relator. It cannot be only the right to
sue. The partial assignment of the United States' "claim" to the rela-
tor may include an assignment of part of the United States' actual
injury. The Government may be considered a "harmed individual,"
and the relator therefore considered to have an assigned status as a
118. Id.
119. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is 'a cardinal principle of
statutory construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant.'" (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
120. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773 n.4.
121. Connecticut v. Physicians Health Serv. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.
2002).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"harmed individual."125 But because only the United States is injured
in a cause of action brought under the Act, although recovery under
the statute runs to both the qui tam relator and the Government, it
may be that there is no "harmed individual," and the statute is puni-
tive with regard to both the relator and the Government.126
Historically, if a cause of action was assignable, then it was also
considered to be survivable.127 The Court's characterization of the Act
as providing a right that is at least partially assignable supports a
finding that the Act survives the death of a party under the long-ac-
cepted common-law rule,128 but contradicts the Court's insistence that
the qui tam relator has no personal injury for purposes of constitu-
tional standing. The Court may not have realized that its characteri-
zation of the qui tam relator as a partial assignee for purposes of
standing in Stevens could have implications for determining the
survivability of a cause of action under the Act. Nevertheless, shortly
after the Stevens decision, the Court had an opportunity to undo some
of the mischief it had wrought by characterizing the Act's treble dam-
ages as penal. In Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chan-
dler,129 the Court unanimously determined that municipalities, which
are presumed to be immune from punitive damages, were subject to
suit under the Act. 130 The Court described the Act's treble damages
provision as having a "compensatory side, serving remedial purposes
in addition to punitive objectives."'131 The Court explained:
There is no question that some liability beyond the amount of the fraud is
usually "necessary to compensate the Government completely for the costs,
delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims." The most obvi-
ous indication that the treble damages ceiling has a remedial place under this
statute is its qui tam feature with its possibility of diverting as much as 30
percent of the Government's recovery to a private relator who began the ac-
tion. In qui tam cases the rough difference between double and triple dam-
ages may well serve not to punish, but to quicken the self-interest of some
private plaintiff who can spot violations and start litigating to compensate the
Government, while benefiting himself as well. 1 3 2
125. Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
126. See id.
127. Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Okla.
1941) ("Assignability and survivability are convertible terms"); Imperial Film
Exch. v. Gen. Film Co., 244 F. 985, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) ("By a long list of deci-
sions the general test of survivability of actions is their assignability.").
128. The common-law rule has its genesis in English law. The common-law rule that
actions in tort do not survive the death of the injured party was first modified by
the Statute of Edward III, 1330, 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (Eng.), to allow an action for tres-
pass to goods and chattels to survive the death of a plaintiff. See Moore v.
Backus, 78 F.2d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1935).
129. 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
130. Id. at 132-34.
131. Id. at 130.
132. Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted).
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The Court further explained that even in the absence of a qui tam
relator, treble damages may be necessary for the Government to fully
recover what it lost due to the fraud. 133 The Court supported its char-
acterization of treble damages as remedial by noting that the Act has
no separate provisions for prejudgment interest, nor does it provide
for recovery of consequential damages.'
3 4
The Court's pronouncements in Stevens and Chandler suggest that
even when the qui tam relator receives the maximum recovery permit-
ted under the Act, because the relator is not personally injured by the
wrongdoer's conduct, the recovery is to compensate for an offense to
the public. But these pronouncements also suggest that the entire
award, including the treble damages, is designed to ensure that the
United States is made whole, and that public rights and duties are
protected and enforced.
c. Proportionality of Recovery Under the Act
In keeping with the Act's purpose of compensating an injured Gov-
ernment, in United States v. Bornstein13 5 the Supreme Court charac-
terized the Act's then-double damages and money penalties of $2,000
per claim as remedial rather than punitive. 13 6 Nevertheless, when
the statute was amended in 1986 to authorize treble damages137 and
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per claim,' 3 8 Congress stated that the
enhanced remedy remained remedial, although intended to make the
Government whole through a form of "rough justice" rather than to
precisely compensate the Government for its losses.139 When amend-
ing the Act in 1986, Congress believed that "[e]ven in the cases where
there is no dollar loss-for example where a defense contractor certi-
133. Id. at 131.
134. Id. Most courts do not interpret the Act to allow for an award of consequential
damages or prejudgment interest. See, e.g., id. at 131; United States v. Aerodex,
Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1973). Contra United States ex rel. Roby v.
Boeing Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (awarding replacement costs
of a defective helicopter to the government). Thus, one could argue that the
treble damages awarded under the Act substitute for the prejudgment interest
and consequential damages that would normally be available to a successful
plaintiff in a fraud case.
135. 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976).
136. But see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. The Act allows this to be reduced to double damages when the defendant has
voluntarily disclosed to the Government information regarding the false claim.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
138. Id. § 3729.
139. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 499 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). Likewise, although a qui tam relator's attor-
neys' fees and costs are separately reimbursable under the Act, see 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(2) (2000), the government's investigative costs and expenses are not
separately reimbursable. See Chandler, 538 U.S. at 131. The treble damages
and penalties take the place of these items. Id.
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fies an untested part for quality yet there are no apparent defects-
the integrity of quality requirements in procurement programs is seri-
ously undermined."140 Under the Act, money penalties are usually
imposed,141 even when the Government has suffered little or no loss
from the defendant's false claims.142 Because penalties can be im-
posed even in the absence of any actual damages, many courts ac-
knowledge that at least the money penalties under the Act are
punitive in nature, and that they are clearly disproportionate to the
damage done.t43 The courts' discomfort with the imposition of large
fines that are disproportionate to actual harm done has led to some
creative approaches to counting false claims for purposes of imposing
damages and penalties.
United States v. Krizekl 44 provides a good example of the courts'
creative approach to alleviating the discomfort they experience when
applying what they consider to be the disproportionate remedies of the
Act. In Krizek, an elderly psychiatrist and his wife, who was his office
manager, were found liable under the Act for submitting false claims
to the Government for Medicare and Medicaid payments over a period
of six years.14 5 Because of the difficulty of determining which claims
were false, the district court determined that on a day where Dr.
Krizek submitted claims for time spent with patients in excess of nine
hours, all claims submitted "in excess of the nine-hour benchmark"
would be considered false, and penalties under the Act would be as-
140. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268; see
also United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) [Mackby II]
(discussing fraud against the Government as not only harming the Government
monetarily, but also harming the administration and integrity of a Government
program), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1657 (2004).
141. Many courts have held that money penalties are mandatory upon a finding of
liability. See, e.g., Mackby 11, 339 F.3d 1013 (imposing penalties of $555,000
when actual damages were $58,151.64); United States v. McLeod, 721 F.2d 282,
285 (9th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Fahner v. Alaska, 591 F. Supp. 794,
801-02 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (imposing penalties for 551 false claims, although actual
damages were less than $20,000). Contra Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45,
55 (5th Cir. 1975) (limiting penalties awarded to prevent implication of the Ex-
cessive Fines clause and to keep proportionality); United States ex rel. Garibaldi
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 546, 565 (E.D. La. 1999) (reducing the
penalty awarded by the jury from $7,850,000 to $100,000, based on prior caselaw
holding that the court has discretion to assure that penalties are not excessive or
disproportionate), vacated on other grounds, 244 F.3d 486, 491-93 (5th Cir.
2001).
142. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273; see
also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 n.5 (1956); United States
ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.
1991), affd, 81 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1996).
143. E.g., United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001) [Mackby I].
144. 192 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 1025.
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sessed for each such claim.14 6 Nevertheless, because the claims sent
to the Government indicated only the type of service performed, not
the precise length of the service, the Special Master appointed by the
district court to calculate Dr. Krizek's liability assumed that each ser-
vice took the minimum amount of time, and calculated the excess
number of claims on that basis.147 Using this methodology, "the Spe-
cial Master identified 264 days on which the Krizeks billed for more
than nine hours, amounting to 1,149 false claims. Multiplying by
$5,000, the minimum fine per claim under the False Claims Act, the
Special Master calculated a total fine of $5.7 million."'14
8
Although approving the Special Master's findings of fact, the dis-
trict court was apparently uncomfortable with the size of the fine and
abandoned the nine-hour benchmark. 14 9 Instead, the court adopted a
twenty-four hour benchmark, holding that the Krizeks would only be
liable for claims submitted on days when they billed for more than
twenty-four hours of work, and only for the services that were ren-
dered after twenty-four hours had passed on a particular day.15o Us-
ing this new benchmark, the court assessed a $10,000 maximum fine
under the Act for each of eleven false claims, entering judgment
against the Krizeks for $110,000.151
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit remanded the case to the district court, instructing
it to consider each billing form submitted by the Krizeks as a single
claim, regardless of how many services for a patient were recorded on
the form. 15 2 It also instructed the district court to allow the Govern-
ment to introduce evidence refuting the Special Master's use of the
minimum amount of time that could be attributed to a particular ser-
vice, and to introduce evidence that Dr. Krizek also saw private-pay
patients on days when he billed excessively, thus potentially increas-
ing the number of Medicare and Medicaid claims submitted in excess
of twenty-four hours a day. 153 Nevertheless, the court did not over-
turn the district court's use of the twenty-four hour benchmark, which
was favorable to the Krizeks. 15 4 The appellate court was apparently
also uncomfortable with the enormity of the original $5.7 million civil
146. Id. at 1025-26.
147. Id. at 1026.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1026-27.
153. Id. at 1027.
154. Id.
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penalty imposed under the Act as compared with the harm to the Gov-
ernment caused by the Krizeks.155
d. The Excessive Fines Clause
Courts recently have held that penalties and treble damages
awarded under the Act that are disproportionate to the gravity of the
defendant's offense implicate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.156 Only punitive for-
feitures implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.157 By holding that the
penalties and treble damages awarded under the Act implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the courts have im-
plicitly held that sanctions under the Act are punitive, without ana-
lyzing whether the Murphy15S (or any other) factors support such a
characterization. 159 In deeming statutory treble damages "punitive,"
the courts have also ignored some obvious differences between true
punitive damages and statutory treble damages. As the Fifth Circuit
has noted: "[P]unitive damages are awarded under notoriously open-
ended legal standards and a broadly defined constitutional limit con-
cerning the amount awarded. Treble damages, however, represent a
mere mathematical expansion of the actual damages calculated by the
155. Id. at 1026. The D.C. Circuit also expressed its displeasure with the Govern-
ment's prolonged prosecution of the case, stating:
This prosecution of a single doctor has now spanned over six years. It
has consumed three weeks of trial, several days of hearings before the
Special Master and the district court, two fully briefed, fully argued ap-
peals, and five published opinions (three by the district court and two by
this court). The five days on which the false claims were made occurred
over twelve years ago. According to defense counsel, Dr. Krizek no
longer practices medicine and is dying of cancer.
It is time for the parties to stop refighting battles long-ago lost and
for the district court to bring this prosecution to an expeditious close.
Id. at 1031. Despite the court's desire that the litigation would end, after remand
to the district court for recalculation of damages, the Krizeks appealed to the D.C.
Circuit again, this time advocating a theory of violation of the Excessive Fines
Clause, see discussion of Mackby I and H, infra this subsection, and when that
failed, requested certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, which
was denied. United States v. Krizek, No. 00-5385, 2001 WL 410310 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 17, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
156. United States v. Mackby, 261 F. 3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001) [Mackby 1]; see also
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327-28, 334 (1998).
157. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
158. See supra, section III.A and accompanying notes.
159. See United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003) [Mackby II],
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1657 (2004). Nevertheless, in Mackby II, the court also
conceded that at least some portion of the sanctions under the Act are remedial,
based on cases construing the pre-Amendment Act's sanctions as remedial. Id. at
1019.
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arbitrator."160 The limited nature of statutory treble damages may
distinguish them from open-ended punitive damages in application of
the Excessive Fines Clause.
16 1
Despite all of the courts' creativity in minimizing the dispropor-
tionate impact of sanctions under the Act, it is difficult to find a gen-
eral rule explaining when recovery under the Act is disproportionate
to the harm suffered, such that the Act would be considered punitive
in nature under the Murphy test. As the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit stated in Mackby //,162 there is no rigid set
of factors used to decide whether a fine is grossly disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense. 163 The Mackby II court looked at the pres-
ence or absence of related illegal activity, the amount of actual harm
caused to the government and others, and the criminal penalties
available under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 16 4 for violating simi-
lar criminal statutes to make this determination. 165 The court also
considered the relationship between the sanctions imposed by the
lower court and the maximum possible sanctions authorized by Con-
gress, as well as the Act's scienter requirement. 16 6 Based on these
factors, the Mackby II court held that a judgment of $729,454.92
under the Act based on actual damages. to the Government of
$58,151.64 was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the
Excessive Fines Clause. 16 7
160. Investment Partners v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 317 (5th
Cir. 2002); see also Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S.
119, 132 (2003).
161. See, e.g., Investment Partners, 298 F.3d at 318 (holdingthat antitrust treble dam-
ages may be "punitive" because they exceed actual damages inflicted on the vic-
tim of the violative conduct, but "are not 'punitive' for purposes of interpreting
the scope of an arbitration clause"). In Chandler, 538 U.S. at 130, the Court im-
plicitly recognized the difference between true punitive damages and the treble
damages available under the Act by characterizing the treble damages as a
"ceiling."
162. United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2003) [Mackby Ill, cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1657 (2004).
163. Id. at 1016 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321 (1998)). Like-
wise, "it would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to determine
the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial
purpose of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes
on the quality of punishment." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989),
abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
164. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2004).
165. 339 F.3d at 1017 (citing United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191,
1197-98 (9th Cir. 1999)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1015, 1017. The court noted that the maximum civil penalty Mackby faced
was $84,990,000. Id. at 1016. If the Mackby II court's assumption that the Act's
sanctions are mainly punitive in nature is accepted, I would expect to see future
challenges to large awards under the Act on the grounds that they violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in
10972005]
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e. Cases Where There Is No Damage
The analysis called for by the third prong of Murphy has no mean-
ing when monetary penalties are imposed under the Act, but the Gov-
ernment has suffered no monetary damage. Such cases are much
more like Blackstone's description of punitive "crimes and misde-
meanors," than remedial actions to make an injured party whole.16s
The money penalties imposed in such a case are by definition dispro-
portionate to the monetary harm inflicted on the United States. This
is true even if some liability beyond the amount of the fraud is re-
quired to completely compensate the Government for losses caused by
the fraudulent claims. 169 The pre-1986 version of the Act, which im-
posed less-onerous penalties than those of the current Act, but had
been construed to allow imposition of such penalties even in the ab-
sence of actual damages, was remedial.17o The fact that the penalties
imposed are higher after the 1986 Amendments to the Act than the
penalties imposed under earlier versions of the Act should not matter
for purposes of proportionality when the Government has suffered no
damages. Whether the penalties are $2,000 per claim, as they were
under older versions of the Act, or $10,000 per claim, as they are
under the current version of the Act, the ratio of penalties to damages
when the damages are zero will still be mathematically undefined,
and by their very nature, disproportionate to damages suffered by the
Government.
B. Using "Civil" and "Criminal" Designations as a Proxy for
"Remedial" and "Punitive" Characterizations
Attempts to simplify the analysis of survivability under the com-
mon-law test by using the label of "civil" or "criminal" as a guide to the
true nature of the Act are also unavailing. Although one would as-
sume that criminal statutes "punish," while civil statutes "compen-
sate" or "remediate," the label "civil" or "criminal" placed on a statute
by Congress does not answer the question of whether a statutory ac-
tion is "penal" or "remedial" under the law. Civil remedies can be
transformed into criminal penalties if they are severe enough in pur-
accordance with the United States Supreme Court's recent resurrection of the
concept of economic substantive due process when reviewing awards of punitive
damages. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (each holding that large
punitive damage awards under state law violate the due process guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
168. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
169. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003) (cit-
ing United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976)).
170. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 315.
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pose or effect.171 The Supreme Court of the United States has in-
structed that "[e]ven in those cases where the legislature 'has
indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired
further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in pur-
pose or effect, '17 2 as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'17
3
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has also in-
structed that "'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legisla-
tive intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty."17 4 Despite the Court's direction that Con-
gress's denomination of a statute as "civil" or "criminal" should be
treated with the utmost respect, a statute characterized by Congress
as "civil" may be considered "penal" for certain purposes, even if it is
not characterized as "criminal."17 5 The question then becomes
whether the statute is penal for all purposes, including the
survivability analysis, or only for selected purposes.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States
has determined that the Act is penal for some, but not for all purposes,
and its denomination as a "civil" statute is not helpful when distin-
guishing between the two. 176 In United States v. Halper,177 the appel-
lee was convicted of sixty-five counts of violation of the criminal False
171. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).
172. Id. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
173. Id. at 99 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Rex Trailer, 350
U.S. at 154).
174. Id. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (finding that "the
labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance" when determining
whether a statutory sanction implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause), abrogated
by Hudson, 522 U.S. 93.
176. The Court first grappled with the 'civil" versus "criminal" nature of the Act in
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution to the Act in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537 (1943). In that case, actual damages to the Government were $101,500, and
the total recovery was $315,000 ($203,000 in double damages and $112,000 in
penalties). Id. at 540. The total recovery to the Government, after the qui tam
relators took their share, was only $150,000. Id. at 545. The Court held that this
amount was purely remedial, because it compensated the Government for ancil-
lary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, and therefore it did
not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 551-52. The present-day Act,
which requires sanctions of treble damages and as much as $11,000 per-claim
penalties, is far more likely to yield a recovery to the Government that is dispro-
portionate to the damages and the ancillary costs incurred by the Government.
177. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper submitted sixty-five demands for reimbursement
from the federal Medicare program over the course of two years at a rate of $12
per claim, when the actual service rendered entitled him to only $3 per claim. Id.
at 436. This resulted in an overpayment of $585. Id.
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Claims Act.178 After Halper's criminal conviction, the Government
brought an action under the Civil False Claims Act based on the same
transactions that formed the basis for the criminal conviction.179 The
statutory penalty called for by the Act totaled $130,000, while the ac-
tual damages to the Government totaled $585.180 The district court
regarded the $130,000 penalty to be so disproportionate to the actual
damages incurred by the Government (more than 220 times greater
than actual damages) that it characterized the money penalty as a
"punishment" that violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, despite the
statute's label as "civil."1 8 '
The Court agreed, stating:
Although, taken together, these cases 1 8 2 establish that proceedings and pen-
alties under the civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature, and that a
civil remedy does not rise to the level of "punishment" merely because Con-
gress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government's actual dam-
ages, they do not foreclose the possibility that in a particular case a civil
penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme and so divorced from the
Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment.
1 8 3
The Court stated the question to be answered in Halper as
"whether a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any
remedial goal that it constitutes 'punishment' for the purpose of
double jeopardy analysis." 184 The Court noted that prior cases were
not helpful in answering the question, because they did not address
situations where an imprecise statutory formula for damages autho-
rizes a remedial sanction that is completely disproportionate to the
Government's damages and actual costs.1 8 5 Writing on a clean slate,
the Court said:
[A] civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanc-
tion as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment .... It
follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a reme-
dial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the
term. 186
The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a defen-
dant who has been criminally prosecuted and punished, and then is
subjected to a civil sanction, if the second sanction is fairly character-
178. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
179. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 439.
182. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Commissioner v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938).
183. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42.
184. Id. at 443.
185. Id. at 446.
186. Id. at 448.
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ized as solely deterrent or retributive.' 8 7 Nevertheless, the Court was
careful to point out that this rule is for the "rare case" where the civil
penalty sought in a proceeding, after a criminal penalty has been im-
posed, is "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages" the of-
fender has caused.1 8 8 Although the Court explicitly left the
determination of what constitutes an "overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate" penalty to the discretion of trial courts, it specifically mentioned
the increased civil penalties of the 1986 Amendments to the Act as an
example of a civil sanction that would constitute a second punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 8 9 Halper appeared to establish
that when sanctions imposed under the Act were "overwhelmingly"
disproportionate to the Government's damages, the Act was punitive.
In so doing, the Court elevated the deterrent and retributive purposes
of the Act over the remedial purposes of the Act, even when the Act
allowed recovery of only double damages and smaller money penalties
than are permitted under today's Act.
Eight years later, in Hudson v. United States,190 the appellants,
relying on Halper, challenged under the Double Jeopardy Clause a
criminal prosecution initiated by the United States after the federal
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency imposed monetary penalties
and administrative debarment on them for violation of a federal bank-
ing statute. 19 1 The criminal prosecution was based on the same trans-
actions that were the basis of the prior administrative actions. 19 2 The
Court, citing "concerns about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy
claims spawned in the wake of Halper,"193 breathed life back into the
labels "criminal" and "civil" by emphasizing that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal pun-
ishments for the same offense." 194 The Hudson Court reiterated that
in the first instance, one must look to Congress's express or implied
label of "civil" or "criminal" for the statute, and that a statute that had
been labeled "civil" by Congress could only be transformed into a crim-
187. Id. at 448-49.
188. Id. at 449.
189. Id. at 450 n.9. The Court also acknowledged that the question of whether a qui
tam action brought under the Act would implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause
remained unresolved. Id. at 451 n.11.
190. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
191. Id. at 95-98; see also Stephanie L. Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for
Health Care Providers: How the Civil False Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and
Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its Damages and Penalties Provision, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 159, 167-68 (2003) (discussing Hudson).
192. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97-98.
193. Id. at 98. For a summary of cases asserting that various civil penalties consti-
tuted "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause in the wake of Halper, see
1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 3.06[A], at n.293.
194. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
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inal penalty if its punitive purpose or effect is "overwhelming."195 The
Court described the following "useful guideposts" for determining
whether a statutory scheme is punitive in either purpose or effect so
as to transform a civil remedy into a criminal penalty:
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5)
"whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned."
19 6
The Hudson Court criticized its prior decision in Halper as having by-
passed the threshold question of whether the successive punishment
was "criminal," and because it focused on the disproportionality of the
sanction to the damage without considering the other guideposts.197
The Court also retreated from its focus on the character of the sanc-
tions imposed in Halper and, in Hudson, emphasized the importance
of relying on Congress's characterization of a statute as "civil."198 Ac-
cording to the Court, the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause
are unnecessary in cases of civil fines, because the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines protections apply to such cases. 199 Furthermore, the
Court acknowledged that attempting to distinguish between "puni-
tive" and "nonpunitive" penalties was inordinately confusing, and that
the confusion outweighed the benefit of the additional protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.200
Hudson established that civil penalties are not subject to analysis
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that such an analysis is re-
served for criminal penalties. But Halper and Hudson also estab-
lished that a "civil" action can be "punitive" even if it is not "criminal,"
without specifically deciding whether a cause of action brought under
the current version of the Act is such an action, and if so, under what
195. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
196. Id. at 99-100 (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
197. Id. at 101.
198. Id. at 103. The Court observed that focusing on the sanction actually imposed
requires that a defendant proceed through trial to judgment before the court can
determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated, which is anti-
thetical to the Clause's prohibition against even attempting a second criminal
punishment. Id. at 102.
199. Id. at 103.
200. Id. In Hudson, the Court applied the test articulated in Ward, 448 U.S. at
248-49, to the money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed on Hudson for
violating the federal banking statutes. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103-05. The Court
held that it was apparent that Congress intended the sanctions to be civil in na-
ture, and that there was no clear proof that the sanctions were so punitive in
form or effect that they were rendered criminal. Id.
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circumstances. Therefore, one must look beyond the label of "civil" or
"criminal" to determine whether a cause of action is punitive or reme-
dial, and whether it survives the death of a party. In the case of the
Act, the "civil" label Congress has placed on the statute is particularly
unhelpful to this analysis, because the Supreme Court of the United
States has described the treble damages authorized under the Act as
both "punitive in nature,"2
0 1 and as having a "remedial place."
2 02
IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE ACT
A. Public Disclosure and "Original Source"
The historical common-law tests of survivability also do not ac-
count for challenges created by a unique provision in the Act limiting
the court's subject matter jurisdiction over certain qui tam cases. The
1943 version of the Act contained a revised jurisdictional bar designed
to prevent the filing of "parasitic" lawsuits such as United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess,20 3 where the relator merely copied the Govern-
ment's preexisting pleadings and filed a qui tam suit. This provision
stated that no court would have jurisdiction over a qui tam suit if the
Government had prior knowledge of the allegations in the com-
plaint.20 4 In 1986, under the impression that as much as ten percent
of the entire federal budget was being lost to fraud,
20 5 Congress
amended the jurisdictional bar to make it possible for qui tam relators
to bring private suits based on information that was already in the
public domain, but which the relator had brought to the public domain
as the "original source":
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Gov-
ernment before filing an action under this section which is based on the
information.
2 0 6
201. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784
(2000).
202. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 131 (2003).
203. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
204. 31 U.S.C. § 233(c) (1976) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2000)). This
provision was a compromise between legislators who wanted to repeal the qui
tam provisions of the Act entirely, and legislators who did not want to amend the
qui tam provisions at all. See 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 1.02.
205. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267-68.
206. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000). In the legislative history to the 1986 Amendments
to the Act, Congress expressed its dismay that the absolute jurisdictional bar of
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Although the meaning of this section, commonly known as the
"public disclosure" bar, has been the subject of extensive litigation,207
it remains clear that a court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a
qui tam case brought under the Act if the case is based on a public
disclosure and the relator is not an original source of the information
on which the allegations are based.208 In a case where the qui tam
relator acknowledges that the suit is based on publicly disclosed infor-
mation, or where the defendant establishes that there has been a pub-
lic disclosure of such information despite the relator's insistence to the
contrary, the court must decide whether the relator is an "original
source" of the information in order to establish that it has subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the case prior to proceeding to the merits.209 The
federal courts cannot hypothesize having subject matter jurisdiction
in order to decide the merits of a case.2 10 The qui tam relator has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her suit is
not based upon a public disclosure, or, if it is, that she was an original
source of the information.211
To be an "original source," the relator must have "direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based."212 "Direct knowledge" is firsthand knowledge, gained without
any intervening agency or outside influence. 2 13 "Independent knowl-
the then-current version of the Act had been interpreted by the courts to prevent
a qui tam relator from pursuing a case even if the Government took no action
after the putative relator informed the Government of the allegations of fraud. S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 12-13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277-78.
207. See 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 4.02. Litigation about the meaning and effect of the
public disclosure provision has centered on whether the list of methods of public
disclosure contained in the statute is exclusive when a qui tam suit is "based
upon" a public disclosure, and what is an "original source" for purposes of the
provision. Id.
208. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
209. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) ("The re-
quirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 'spring[s] from
the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible
and without exception.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater &
Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng'g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 163 F.3d 516, 521-22
(9th Cir. 1998); see FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1).
212. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
213. United States ex rel. Kinney v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003); United
States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 656
(D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991).
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edge" is defined as knowledge independent of any public disclosure.
2 14
When a qui tam relator files a suit under the Act, the relator is re-
quired to prepare and serve on the Government a "written disclosure
of substantially all material evidence and information" the relator pos-
sesses. 2 15 In addition to educating the Government about the case so
that the Government can decide whether or not to intervene, the dis-
closure statement also assists the court in determining whether the
relator has the "direct and independent knowledge" necessary to
maintain a suit where information has been publicly disclosed.
2 16
B. Discovery Issues
The law is unsettled as to whether a defendant can discover the
relator's disclosure statement to the Government. In one line of cases,
the courts have held that no privilege attaches to the disclosure state-
ment and supplementary materials, and subsequently permitted dis-
covery.2 17 Other courts have held that the disclosure statement is
subject to the attorney work product privilege,
2 18 the joint prosecution
privilege, 2 19 or the law enforcement privilege.
2 20 Still other courts
have permitted discovery of some parts of the disclosure statement,
but not others.
2 2 '
Even if the disclosure statement is discoverable, defendants are
likely to zealously advocate that it is no substitute for the ability to
cross-examine the relator regarding the source of her knowledge of
214. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032,
1048 (8th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech.,
Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000).
215. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
216. 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 4.04[A]; see also, United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe
Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 320-22 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the Government's motion
to dismiss the case under a public disclosure bar while the complaint was under
seal); United States ex rel. Alcohol Found., Inc. v. Kalmanovitz Charitable
Found., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 458, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the Govern-
ment's suggestion to the court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
relator's claims under a public disclosure bar), affd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25720
(2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2002).
217. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 904 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D.
Ky. 1995); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 144 F.R.D. 396 (D.
Colo. 1992).
218. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 561 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
219. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680, 686
(S.D. Cal. 1996).
220. See, e.g., In re Subpoena to the United States Attorney's Office, No. M 8-85-BSJ,
2000 WL 45726, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2000).
221. See, e.g., Grand ex rel. United States v. Northrop Corp., 811 F. Supp. 333, 337
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (determining that a relator's analysis should be redacted prior to
discovery by defendant based on in camera inspection of the relator's disclosure
materials).
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publicly disclosed information. Obviously, the most relevant and
fruitful source for discovery on issues of the relator's direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of information forming the allegations of the com-
plaint is the relator. The relator's deposition is virtually irreplaceable
to defendants attempting to refute a relator's allegations that she is
an "original source" in cases where there has been a public
disclosure.222
When the relator dies before the defendant has taken the relator's
deposition, even if the court believes that the disclosure statement and
the material evidence contained therein are sufficient for the court to
determine that it does have jurisdiction, the defendant will argue that
it is severely prejudiced due to its inability to cross-examine the rela-
tor regarding public disclosure and original source allegations. Gener-
ally, a court may order dismissal as a remedy to prevent unfairness to
a defendant due to the inability to obtain discovery from a plaintiff.223
Nevertheless, the death of a plaintiff prior to discovery of the plaintiff
does not automatically mandate dismissal of the claim.2 24 A court will
balance the prejudice to the defendant caused by the death of the
222. The arguments of the parties made in United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters
of Providence in Oregon, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002), provide an example
of the importance of the availability of the relator to the subject matter jurisdic-
tion determination and to the defendant. In Harrington, the defendants moved to
dismiss the qui tam complaint after the relator's death, arguing (among other
things) that there was a likelihood that the information on which the relator's
allegations were based had been publicly disclosed, and that the death of the rela-
tor severely prejudiced the defendant and precluded the court from inquiring into
its subject matter jurisdiction, thereby warranting dismissal. Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint
Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) at 8-10, Harrington (No. CV 98-1487 JO).
The relator's estate's representative argued in response that the burden of estab-
lishing subject matter jurisdiction was on the relator, and therefore the defen-
dant was not prejudiced. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) at 13,
Harrington (No. CV 98-1587-JO); see also 2 JAMES MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 12.30[5] (3d ed. 2004). The relator's estate's representative also
reminded the court that the defendant had opposed a prior attempt by relator's
counsel to perpetuate the relator's testimony. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) at 13, Harrington (No. CV 98-1587-JO). The defendants replied
that regardless of who has the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction, the death of the relator severely prejudiced the defendants'
ability to defend against the case, because it prejudiced the defendants' ability to
even bring a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
much less meet the burden of proof on the motion. Defendants' Reply to Plain-
tiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Com-
plaint Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) at 7-9, Harrington (No. CV-98-1587
JO).
223. Wehling v. CBS, 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979); MacDonald v. Time,
Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D. N.J. 1983).
224. MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1059.
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plaintiff against the right of the plaintiffs successors to pursue the
suit.2 25 There are no reported cases in which a court has engaged in
such a balancing test with regard to prejudice to a defendant's ability
to assert the Act's jurisdictional bar caused by a qui tam relator's
death. Nevertheless, at least one case has suggested that if a plaintiff
is an original and direct source of information that formed the basis
for a statement that was the subject of a defamation action, and the
defendant is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff
regarding the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement, dismissal
may be required to alleviate the prejudice to the defendant.
226
One commentator has suggested that prejudice to the defendant
can be alleviated in a case where a "private" plaintiff in a defamation
action dies by shifting the burden of proving that the statement is true
from the defendant to the plaintiff, or by shifting the burden of prov-
ing certain defenses from the defendant to the plaintiff.2 2 7 Although
this might relieve a defendant of an ultimate burden of proof on an
issue at trial, such burden-shifting does not alleviate prejudice to a
defendant caused by the inability to bring a defensive motion to dis-
miss due to the defendant's inability to meet the burdens of production
or proof on the motion because of the relator's death. Nor does it re-
lieve the defendant of the prejudice caused by the inability to effec-
tively challenge the relator's ability to meet the burden of proof on the
issue, even if the initial burden is shifted to the plaintiff. In a case
brought under the Act, the determination of the relator's original
source status is even more crucial than the ability to determine the
truth of information from its source in a defamation case. Under the
Act, the court's subject matter jurisdiction depends on the relator's
original source status, and the court cannot even consider the merits
of the case without making this threshold determination. Neither the
Murphy test nor any other historical test for survivability takes into
account the challenges raised by the Act's jurisdictional bar in a case
where the qui tam relator dies.
225. Id. at 1060.
226. Id. In MacDonald, the court contrasted the situation at hand, where the defen-
dant was not claiming that the plaintiff was the original and direct source of the
information on which the allegedly defamatory statement was based, with a hy-
pothetical situation in which a plaintiff was such an original and direct source.
Id. at 1059. Because in the case at hand, the plaintiff was not alleged to be the
original and direct source of the information, the court held that the prejudice to
the defendants caused by the plaintiffs death was not "substantial," and refused
to dismiss the case. Id. at 1060.
227. Florence Frances Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the
Antiquated "Actio Personalis" Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1848-49 (1985).
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V. A POLICY-BASED PROPOSAL FOR SURVIVABILITY
A. The Importance of Congressional Intent
In light of the difficulty of applying the historical test in determin-
ing whether a qui tam relator's cause of action under the Act survives
the relator's death, and the unhelpfulness of Congress's characteriza-
tion of a statute as "civil" or "criminal," "penal" or "remedial" to make
that determination, the courts must look to some other criteria to de-
termine whether a qui tam relator's cause of action is survivable.
Rather than trying to wedge all federal statutory causes of action into
the ancient "penal" or "remedial" categories in cases involving federal
statutes that create rights that were unknown at common law, codify
rights that previously existed at common law, or significantly modify
rights that were codified centuries ago, if there is no explicit statutory
provision addressing survivability, the primary consideration should
be whether survival of a cause of action under the statute furthers the
purpose of the statute as expressed by Congress. 228
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the impor-
tance of congressional intent when determining whether a federal
statutory cause of action survived the death of one of the parties in
Cox v. Roth.229 In Cox, the Court was faced with the question of
whether an action brought under the Jones Act230 survives the death
of the defendant tortfeasor. The Cox Court acknowledged that at com-
mon law, actions for personal injury abated upon the death of one of
the parties, but characterized the rule as one of "extreme harsh-
ness."2 3 1 To alleviate the harshness of the common-law rule, the
Court looked to the policy behind the Jones Act, which it understood to
be to fully provide for compensation of injured seamen or their fami-
lies regardless of the nature or identity of the tortfeasor.23 2 To ex-
plain *its decision to abandon the common-law rule regarding
survivability, the Court said:
The policy as well as the letter of the law is a guide to decision. Resort to the
policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to qualify
its apparent absolutes .... The process of interpretation also misses its high
function if a strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or deletion of a
provision which a less literal reading would preserve. 2 3 3
The Cox Court also noted that abandoning the common-law rule of
survivability of tort actions was in accordance with the trend among
the states:
228. Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 674, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
229. 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955).
230. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000). The Jones Act provides a cause of action for seamen
injured at sea against the owners of seagoing vessels. Id.
231. 348 U.S. at 210.
232. Id. at 209.
233. Id. (citing Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945)).
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[Wie do note that advancing civilization and social progress have brought 43
of our States to include in their general law the principle of the survival of
causes of action against deceased tortfeasors, and that such recovery, rather
than being exceptional, has now become the rule in almost every common-law
jurisdiction.
2 3 4
The courts' willingness to elevate the law's policy and Congress's
intent over historical characterization need not be limited to statutes
that codify common-law causes of action, but may also be applied to
statutes that create new federal causes of action, that were either un-
known at common law or that significantly modify ancient causes of
action. As the Supreme Court of the United States said over one-hun-
dred years ago, "[wihether an action survives [or abates upon the
death of a party] depends on the substance of the cause of action, not
on the forms of proceeding to enforce [the action] .235 Just as the his-
torical "personal" versus "property" nature of a tort need not be dispos-
itive of the survivability of a tort action, the terms "penal" or
"remedial" need not be dispositive of the nature of federal statutory
action. Such terms are merely shorthand for the relevant considera-
tions as to whether a cause of action should survive the death of a
party.2 36 The question of survivability of a federal statutory claim is
essentially a question of statutory interpretation.
23 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has recognized the need to abandon the historical distinctions
of "penal" versus "remedial" when it comes to determining the
survivability of federal statutes that create new rights or significantly
change rights that existed at common law. For example, in Mallick v.
International Brotherhood of Electric Workers,2 38 a member of a labor
union sought disclosure of the union's financial records under the La-
bor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA").239
Before an appeal of the trial court's decision in favor of the plaintiff
could be filed, the plaintiff died.240 The union argued that the plain-
tiffs cause of action abated upon his death, relying on the common-
law distinction between suits based on personal torts and suits based
on property or contract rights. 24 1 The court flatly stated that "these
cases no longer control adjudication of survivorship issues associated
with federal claims," noting the "difficulty of forcing many newer stat-
234. Id. at 210.
235. Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884).
236. Riggs v. Gov't Employees Fin. Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1980).
237. Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 674, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing
Cox, 348 U.S. at 210).
238. 814 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
239. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-531 (2000).
240. Mallick, 814 F.2d at 675.
241. Id. at 676, 678.
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utory rights into its somewhat archaic and rigid distinction between
personal and property claims."
24 2
Rather than trying to determine whether a cause of action for dis-
closure of financial information under the LMRDA was based on "per-
sonal" or "property" rights, or was "penal" or "remedial," the Mallick
court focused on the legislative history of the LMRDA, which indi-
cated that a primary goal of the LMRDA was deterrence of financial
abuses by unions. 24 3 The Mallick court held that the plaintiffs cause
of action for disclosure of information under the LMRDA survived the
plaintiffs death, because the statute's goal of deterrence of financial
wrongdoing by unions would be best served by allowing an action for
disclosure under the LMRDA to survive the death of a particular
union member.2 44
Twelve years later, in Sinito v. United States Department of Jus-
tice,2 45 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a cause of action seeking the release of information
held by the Government under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA")246 could survive the death of a plaintiff. In Sinito, the defen-
dant argued that under the historical common-law test, FOIA was not
a remedial statute, and therefore did not survive the death of the
plaintiff requesting information. 24 7 Although the trial court agreed,
and dismissed the case, the court, following its precedent in Mallick,
disregarded the common-law rule. Instead, the Sinito court looked to
whether allowing the action to survive the death of the plaintiff would
further Congress's goals in enacting FOIA.248 The Sinito court re-
viewed the legislative history of FOIA and held that allowing a case
brought under FOIA to survive the death of the plaintiff would foster
one of the "paramount goals" of FOIA: the goal of deterring secrecy in
government and government corruption. 2 49
The Sinito defendants tried to distinguish Mallick by arguing that
FOIA creates a right of access available to all citizens, as opposed to
the defined class who are permitted to exercise the right of access
under the LMRDA, and thus, creates a right that was somehow less
"personal" than the right held to survive the death of the plaintiff in
Mallick.250 The Sinito court was unimpressed by this argument. In
242. Id. at 678.
243. Id. at 677.
244. Id.
245. 176 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Judge Wald authored both the Mallick and the
Sinito opinions.
246. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
247. 176 F.3d at 513.
248. Id. at 513-14.
249. Id. at 514.
250. Sinito, 176 F.3d at 514.
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holding that a claim for disclosure under FOIA can survive the death
of the plaintiff, the court noted:
Moreover, we are dealing here not with a vast pool of potential FOIA appli-
cants, any of whom might seek to take Thomas Sinito's place in the litigation.
An original requestor who goes to court to compel disclosure by the agency has
a stake in the legal action which transcends that of "any person" who might
seek the FOIA document. He has invested time, and in all likelihood money,
in the action .... The fact that other citizens could have brought a similar
action originally in no way vitiates that conclusion.
2 5 1
The logic of Sinito applies equally to qui tam causes of action
brought under the Act. As in Sinito, a qui tam cause of action cannot
be brought by any member of the public. A cause of action under the
Act sounds in fraud.2 52 Therefore, it must be pled with particular-
ity.253 This operates to ensure that only persons with real knowledge
of actual fraud can bring such cases, as opposed to members of the
public at large engaging in "fishing expeditions."2 54 Furthermore, the
jurisdictional bar prevents members of the public from engaging in
copycat filings, ensuring that a stranger to the alleged fraud cannot
replace the relator with actual knowledge. 2 55
B. The Advantages of Using Congressional Intent To
Determine Survivability
Applying the approach of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Mallick and Sinito to qui tam cases
brought under the Act preserves the proper role of Congress in creat-
ing a cause of action and the proper role of the courts in interpreting
its scope in accordance with Congress's will.256 It also allows the
courts to avoid trying to determine whether recovery runs to a
"harmed individual," as required under the Murphy test, by parsing
the complex and contradictory relationship between the qui tam rela-
tor and the Government. The courts are also saved from having to
choose between the punitive aspects of the Act and the remedial as-
pects of the Act, and from elevating one over the other to reach a just
result.
The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments to the Act makes it
clear that Congress intended the current version of the Act to be a
mechanism to compensate the Government for dollars lost to fraud,
251. Id. at 515.
252. 2 BOESE, supra note 3, § 5.04, at n.162.
253. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
254. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d
304, 309 (5th Cir. 1999).
255. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000).
256. Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 674, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("When
an Act of Congress has created the action at issue, the role of the courts in decid-
ing the survivorship issue is to effectuate the will of Congress as best they can.").
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and to deter potential violators from embarking on a course of de-
frauding the Government. 2 57 The Senate Report accompanying the
1986 Amendments states:
Even in the cases where there is no dollar loss-for example where a defense
contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet there are no apparent de-
fects-the integrity of quality requirements in procurement programs is seri-
ously undermined.
2 5 8
The qui tam provisions of the original 1863 Act were
passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization,
that one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds
on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private
persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or
the hope of gain.
2 5 9
In the 1986 Amendments, Congress sought to increase the deterrent
effect of the Act not only by substantially increasing the amount of
money that can be assessed against a defendant found liable, but by
easing the restrictions on who can be a qui tam relator to encourage
fraud-fighting by private citizenry.260
C. Applying the Test of Congressional Intent to the Act
The purposes of the Act are advanced by permitting a qui tam rela-
tor's cause of action under the Act to survive the death of the relator.
Furthermore, the Act's jurisdictional bar assures that no person other
than the relator's legal representative can continue the suit, because
once the qui tam case is filed, the information underlying the allega-
tions is publicly disclosed under the Act. 2 61 Such a suit can only be
pursued by the original source of the information, and no outsider
would qualify.262 If the relator's legal representative cannot pursue
the case, no other private citizen would be able to do so, and Con-
gress's intent to enlist and encourage private persons to assist the
Government in fighting fraud would be frustrated. 26 3
257. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5271-72.
258. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268.
259. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276 (quoting United States v. Gris-
wold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)).
260. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273.
261. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000); FED. R. Crv. P. 25. The term "civil hearing" in the
statute has been construed broadly, such that even the filing of a complaint, with-
out further proceedings, constitutes a "public disclosure." See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994).
262. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
263. The Government could request permission from the court to intervene upon the
relator's death. Id. § 3730(c)(3). Nevertheless, given the limited resources of the
Government, it is unlikely that the Government will seek to later intervene in a
case that it declined to prosecute initially simply because the relator has now
died. See supra note 11.
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Although allowing a qui tam action under the Act to survive the
death of the relator furthers the will of Congress, it does present the
problem of potential prejudice to defendants. Nevertheless, potential
prejudice to defendants can be alleviated by applying ordinary princi-
ples of federal civil procedure to each case on a case-by-case basis. In
cases where either the defendant or the relator has presented evi-
dence that information on which the allegations of the complaint are
based was publicly disclosed, as defined by the Act, and where the
relator dies, the court should decide whether the parties have had suf-
ficient opportunity to develop the evidence regarding whether the re-
lator was an "original source" of the information. 2 64 If the relator's
legal representative cannot establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the relator was an "original source," the court must dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 26 5 If the court deter-
mines that prejudice to the defendant caused by the relator's death is
so great that allowing the suit to continue would be fundamentally
unfair, the court can dismiss the case on those grounds, without find-
ing that the relator's cause of action abates upon his death.266
The survival of an action imposing treble damages and money pen-
alties against a defendant, almost one-third of which may go to the
estate of a relator who suffered no injury, is troubling under the com-
mon-law test for survivability of a federal statutory action. Neverthe-
less, it is not particularly troubling under a public-policy-based test.
Congress's stated purpose in increasing potential damages and penal-
ties and making private enforcement easier and more attractive was
to pique the interest of private persons to assist the Government in
fighting fraud.2 67 The interest of an ill or elderly person, who wishes
to leave her estate to her legal representatives or successors, in assist-
ing the Government in fighting fraud, is likely to be as strong as the
interest of a healthy or young person in self-enrichment. Private anti-
trust cases brought under federal statutes that authorize an award of
264. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). The issue of "original source" only arises if there is "pub-
licly disclosed" information within the meaning of the statute. United States ex
rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991). Contra United
States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Colo. 1990). Therefore, this
problem will only arise in a small subset of cases.
265. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
266. See MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D. N.J. 1983) (stating that
dismissal is a proper remedy when unfair prejudice exists). The court in such a
case may want to consider whether the defendant diligently pursued discovery of
the relator on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction prior to the relator's death,
or whether the defendant opposed a perpetuation deposition of the relator.
267. See Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 131 (2003)
(noting that treble damages will not so much serve to punish as much as they will
"quicken" the interests of individuals to investigate, litigate, and benefit
themselves).
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treble damages have been held to survive a private plaintiffs death,
based on Congress's intent to encourage private enforcement of the
antitrust laws through the treble damage remedy.268 Unlike a qui
tam relator, who has suffered no personal injury of his own, a private
plaintiff can only sue under the antitrust law if the plaintiffs business
or property has been injured. 26 9 Nevertheless, the qui tam relator's
status as a "partial assignee" of the injured Government provides the
relator status at least equivalent to that of a person injured by an
antitrust violation for purposes of survivability and public policy.
Even in cases where the Government has suffered no damages, the
money penalties available under the Act may serve to compensate the
Government for nonrecoverable consequential damages, 2 70 and this
consequential injury may be part of the Government's "partial assign-
ment" to the relator. Furthermore, the recent trend towards applying
the Excessive Fines Clause to recoveries under the Act,271 and the
reemergence of economic substantive due process in the context of pu-
nitive damage awards, 272 make it likely that there are sufficient
checks on the court's ability to award damages that are completely
disproportionate to any harm suffered by the Government, regardless
of the survivability of the relator's action.2 73
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as the pirate leaves a map for his successor to find the hidden
treasures the pirate had accumulated in life, a qui tam relator's com-
plaint and disclosure statement are the map left for successors or legal
representatives to uncover fraud against the Government, and reap
the rewards of the relator's discovery. The Act is a powerful tool that
Congress has created to protect the public fisc, deter fraud, and assist
the Government in uncovering fraud that has already occurred. None
of these purposes are served by abatement of relator's action upon
268. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Survival of Right of Action for Damages
Based on Violation of Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 A.L.R. FED. 963, 973 n.14
(1972). Nevertheless, there is no agreement among the courts as to whether
treble damages survive the death of a private antitrust plaintiff, or if the legal
representative of the plaintiff is limited to pursuing actual damages. Id.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2004).
270. See 1 BOESE, supra note 3, § 3.03[A] [3].
271. See supra subsection III.A.2.d.
272. See supra note 167.
273. It is also possible that a court could adopt the U.S. Supreme Court's characteriza-
tion of treble damages as a "ceiling" and impose less than treble damages in a
case where the relator has died. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chan-
dler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003); see also Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade,
244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957) (allowing a claim to survive in a private antitrust
enforcement action, but limiting recovery to actual damages after the defendant's
death); Trunk, supra note 13, at 174 (proposing a two-tiered damage and penalty
structure for the Act to alleviate its punitive effect).
1114 [Vol. 83:1073
DEAD MEN TELLING TALES
death; on the contrary, they are furthered by permitting a relator's
action to survive death and continue to be pursued by the relator's
legal representatives. The statute's jurisdictional bar, the inherent
power of the courts to dismiss a case when the defendant is exces-
sively prejudiced by an inability to defend against it, and the constitu-
tional protections against disproportionate remedies provide sufficient
protections for defendants who might be severely prejudiced by the
death of the relator.
As more and more qui tam cases are brought,2 74 and as they allege
more and more complicated fraudulent schemes, they take more and
more time to work their way through the Government's investigative
process and our overcrowded courts. The likelihood of a relator dying
before a case comes to its conclusion continues to increase. A qui tam
relator's case under the Act has been described as "the gift that keeps
on giving."2 75 The will of Congress, and protection of the public, is
best served when the gift of a relator's claim under the Act can be
given posthumously to the relator's legal representatives.
274. See 2 BOESE, supra note 3, app. H-i, for a chart showing the steady increase in
qui tam filings under the Act.
275. Pursuit of False Claims, supra note 9.
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